ABSTRACT: The extensions of response-dependent concepts are a priori connected with the subjective responses that competent users of that concept have in normal conditions. There are two strategies for specifying normal conditions for response-dependent concepts: topic-specific and topic-neutral. On a topic-specific specification, a characterisation of normal conditions would be given separately for each response-dependent concept (or a non-trivial subset of response-dependent concepts, such as our colour concepts), whereas a topicneutral specification would be given in a uniform way for all response-dependent concepts. In this paper I argue, using a thought experiment, that only topic-neutral specifications will deliver the a priori knowledge constitutive of response-dependence.
Response-dependent analyses have been proposed for various concepts and areas of discourse. Often, such analyses are put forward with the hope of being able to combine two views: firstly, a realist view of the referents of the discourse, or the view that statements made in the discourse can be objectively true, and secondly, the view that the concepts themselves are, in some fairly direct way, dependent on our subjective responses.
In general, a response-dependent analysis for concept C claims the following (Johnston 1989, 145) :
It is a priori that (x is C iff x is such as to produce [an x-directed response] R in [a group of subjects] S under conditions K).
Typically, subjects S and conditions K are read as normal subjects and normal conditions, respectively. Analyses of this sort are particularly wide-spread for our colour concepts.
Furthermore, for colour concepts the response R is taken to be that of judging that x is of a particular colour, or that of x seeming to be of one. Thus, we would get analyses of the following sort, here for the concept RED 1 [e.g. Wright 1988: 44; Johnston 1992: 232; Pettit 1996: 196] :
(RD RED ) It is a priori that (x is red iff x would seem red to / be judged to be red by normal subjects under normal conditions).
There is disagreement about whether the response-dependence biconditionals, i.e. the biconditionals claimed to be a priori in analyses of type (RD), should be thought of as necessary or contingent, 2 but they are generally (with the exception of Miscevic 1998) 3 thought of as a priori. The claim is not, of course, that sensory experience is not needed for the acquisition of a response-dependent concept, but rather that someone who possesses the concept can come to know that the relevant biconditional is true by mere arm-chair reflection on his or her own intuitions about how the concept is applied.
Obviously, a lot turns on how we specify normal conditions and normal subjects. I will here discuss the question of normal conditions, but my comments will carry on to our specification of normal subjects as well. It is typically required that normal conditions be given a substantial definition, in contrast to a what-ever-it-takes specification which would trivialize (RD RED ) by defining normal conditions as just those in which normal observers are 1 I am using small capitals to denote concepts. 2 They are explicitly claimed to be necessary by Powell [1998] , Wright [1998] and Johnston [1998] , while the view that they are contingent is argued for by Pettit [1991] and Haukioja [2001] . The former view is natural if one thinks that belief in the relevant biconditional is (part of) what it takes to possess a response-dependent concept; the latter view suggests itself if one thinks that response-dependence is a consequence of the way our responses fix the reference of the concepts in question. The disagreement concerns the modal status of responsedependence biconditionals which do not contain any rigidifying devices; even proponents of contingency will agree that if the biconditional rigidifies on actual subjects and actual normal conditions, the biconditional will be necessary. Another way to express the distinction between these two views is to say that on the former, the a priori biconditional holds in virtue of the application conditions of the concept in question, while on the latter it holds in virtue of its possession conditions [see Pettit 1991: 602] . The argument given in this paper applies equally to either kind of view: both views claim that the response-dependence biconditionals are a priori under some substantial specification of normal conditions, and my claim below will be that they can be a priori only under a certain kind of specification. 3 Edwards [1992] argues (using different terminology) that there might be response-dependent concepts for which the biconditionals are a posteriori, but he does not take a stand on whether any of our concepts fall into this category. reliable in their colour judgements. 4 My aim in this paper is to show that more restrictions are needed: only a certain kind of substantial specification, a topic-neutral one, can make a priori knowledge of response-dependence biconditionals available, and hence only a topic-neutral specification will support an analysis such as (RD RED ). I will here restrict my discussion to the concept RED and (RD RED ), but a similar argument could, as far as I can see, be given for any concept suggested to be response-dependent.
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Before going on, it is perhaps worth noting that a response-dependent account of colour error theory of colour, and colour projectivism. Error theory is ruled out because some things do, after all, seem red (or blue etc.) to us: given that there are normal conditions, it follows from (RD RED ) that some things really are red. Projectivism is ruled out because it is objects which seem to us to possess colours: this, with (RD RED ), implies that it really is objects which are coloured, and not areas of the visual field, or anything of that sort.
There are two general strategies for giving substantial specifications of normal conditions: topic-specific and topic-neutral specifications. In a topic-specific specification for a given concept, we would be given a characterisation of the specific types of conditions which are normal for the application of that concept or of the group of concepts to which that concept belongs. Specifications would, in other words, be given one by one, and not in a uniform way for all response-dependent concepts. Topic-neutral specifications, in contrast, would be given in a uniform way for all response-dependent concepts. The only suggestion for a topic-neutral specification that has been worked out in detail is the 'ethocentric' account given by Philip Pettit [1996: 92-95; 1999 ]. Pettit gives a functionalist account of normal conditions: we should look at the practices of those who possess response-dependent concepts and see which kinds of circumstances are treated as normal, in the sense that judgements made in those conditions are not later rejected in favour of judgements made in other conditions. His claim is that a similar pattern can be found in the application of all response-dependent concepts. Possessing a response-dependent concept, and knowing how disagreements are resolved, enables one to specify normal conditions in a higher-order way as those which are such as to survive the practices of discounting divergent responses. As theorists, we can abstract away from particular concepts to arrive at the following general, topic-neutral specification:
(TN) Normal conditions for the application of a response-dependent concept C are conditions which are such as not to generate interpersonal or intrapersonal discrepancy of response among those who possess C.
Pettit claims that it is under this functionalist specification that we can have a priori knowledge of response-dependence biconditionals. As stated, (TN) leaves open the question of how to resolve discrepancies that arise -in other words, how to decide which conditions are normal when there is a discrepancy. This is by no means trivial [cf. Pettit 1999; Hindriks 2004; Haukioja 2005] . In the case of our colour concepts, something like a majority rule for resolving discrepancies seems plausible, but I will here leave open whether and how the majority rule might need to be qualified, and whether another kind of decision procedure (such as one relying on deference to experts) is compatible with (TN).
I have argued elsewhere [Haukioja 2005 ], using a thought experiment in which we encounter unexpected but systematically limited variance in our colour judgements, that topic-neutral specifications are more fundamental than topic-specific ones: we can get (TS RED ) only by deriving it from (TN), together with specific information about the kinds of conditions under which our colour judgements in fact satisfy (TN). Here I will use the same thought experiment to arrive at a stronger conclusion: not only is (TN) more fundamental than (TS RED ); if the requirement of normality is read as (TS RED ), (RD RED ) is not so much as true, because (TS RED ) cannot sustain the a priority of the biconditional. That is, while the biconditional may be true on (TS RED ), its truth can only be known a posteriori. If we want our biconditionals to be a priori, as response-dependence theorists have generally done, topic-specific specifications of normal conditions will not do; (TN) or some derivative of it seems to be our best bet.
Here is the thought experiment. Suppose it were found out that, for an unknown reason, normal, otherwise red tulips look blue to average, competent viewers in a particular remote village in the Himalayas (both the villagers and the visitors, we may assume). No matter how attentive the viewers and how flawless their perceptual capacities, at noon on a cloudy summer's day, out of doors and out of shadow, the tulips which everyone would agree were red before they were brought to the village all look blue. As soon as the tulips are transported out of the village again, they look red. In other words, the conditions fit (TS RED ) perfectly, yet the tulips look blue.
The problem for the friend of (TS RED ) is obvious. If (RD RED )&(TS RED ) is true, it seems to
follow that the normal tulips are not red when they are observed in the village. As far as I can see, there are four ways one might try to maintain (RD RED )&(TS RED ). I will now look at each of them and claim that they all fail.
The first two ways fail in rather obvious ways. I will mention them here just to get them out of the way. First, one might say that our concept RED has changed, because (TS RED ) would in this situation be revised to include a clause which discounts judgements about the colours of tulips made in this village. In other words, (TS RED ) would be replaced (TS RED )*, and hence our concept RED would have been replaced by RED*. But surely it would be counter-intuitive to postulate such conceptual change. Ordinary attributions of redness to objects would not suddenly mean something different after our encounter with the strange phenomena in the Himalaya. Second, one might say that (TS RED ) included a such clause all along. That is, there is no conceptual change here: rather, the strange phenomena encountered in the thought experiment would show us something about the specification of normal conditions that was associated with our concept RED all along. But this is simply absurd: how could the biconditional in (RD RED )&(TS RED ) be a priori if the clause excluding the Himalayan village only becomes apparent to us after we get empirical information about colour judgements?
Third, one might insist that the colour of tulips changes as we take them into the village and out again, despite our initial intuitions to the contrary. This reply deserves closer attention than the first two, but I think it fails, too. The main problem is that postulating such a colour change simply does not fit with our common-sense intuitions. First, we should note that we do not say that the colours of things change when we take them to strange, clearly abnormal lighting conditions. 6 Rather, we say things like "white things look greenish in green light", and so on. We have a strong assumption of colours being relatively stable; things do not change colour just on being transported. The fact that conditions seem perfectly normal in the village is not enough to show that they are normal. The rational conclusion to make in the scenario depicted would be to conclude that conditions in the village are not normal for judging colours, even if we do not know what makes them abnormal.
If the third option still seems plausible, consider adding the following twist to the thought experiment. Suppose that it were discovered that there is an explanation for the variance in our colour judgements, but it has nothing to do with lighting. Perhaps there are some strange fumes in the air that, when inhaled, affect the colour judgements one makes about tulips; the details do not matter. In this case it should be even more obvious that we would say that the tulips do not change colour, and that the conditions are not normal. Yet, according to (TS RED ) they are normal, for there is nothing abnormal about the lighting. The upshot is that one cannot know a priori all the different factors which might conceivably affect our colour judgements, and (RD RED )&(TS RED ) cannot be true.
Finally, the fourth option. It might be suggested that the thought experiment does not show that (RD RED )&(TS RED ) is false; in the imaginary situation we should simply conclude that the conditions were not relevantly like those which "actually normally obtain out-ofdoors, out-of-shadow, at noon on a cloudy summer's day". Especially if we suppose that a change in the surface structure of the tulips has been ruled out, one might be tempted to say that we can conclude, from the arm-chair, that the conditions cannot be normal, as specified in (TS RED ). This option may look attractive, but I think it will not work, for at least two reasons. First, it seems to me that this reply trivializes (TS RED ). On this view, we would conclude that conditions were not normal precisely because the judgements made in the village are incorrect: but if that is sufficient for concluding that the requirements of normality given in (TS RED ) were not satisfied, we have given (TS RED ) a whatever-it-takes reading.
(TS RED ) was supposed to tell us which conditions are such that colour judgements made in those conditions are reliable, but now we are using the reliability of colour judgements to determine which conditions are relevantly like those specified in (TS RED ). That is, we are no longer relying on (TS RED ) to tell us which conditions are normal; we are using some other, independent standard of normality to tell us which conditions are relevantly like "those which actually normally obtain out-of-doors and out-of-shadow at noon on a cloudy summer's day".
Second, (TS RED ) states a requirement on the conditions of lighting, but as we saw above, the disturbance may have nothing to do with those. That, is, although we may be able to conclude, from the arm-chair, that something has gone wrong, we clearly cannot conclude that it is the lighting conditions which are to blame. There are all kinds of factors which could conceivably influence our colour perceptions and colour judgements, and we obviously cannot give an exhaustive list of such possible factors a priori. Hence, response-dependence theories should specify normal conditions in a topic-neutral way.
10 conditions (cf. footnote 2), but for different reasons. On an application-condition account they are a priori for a straightforward reason: belief in the biconditional is a prerequisite for possessing the concept in question. On a possession-condition account the biconditionals are a priori for familiar Kripkean reasons: our responses fix the reference of the concept to that property, whichever it happens to be, which actually causes the appropriate responses in normal conditions [Pettit 1999: 36-38] . 9 They are substantial because normal conditions have not been simply defined as those in which seeming F and being F do not come apart; it takes considerable reflection to see the truth of the biconditionals [Pettit 1999: 38-39] . I might add an additional, indirect reason to think they are substantial: Hindriks [2004] claims that the response-dependence biconditionals are false under the topic-neutral specification. If (TN) trivialized (RDRED), this should be quite strange: surely trivialities should be criticized on the grounds that they are trivially true, not on the grounds that one thinks they are false! For a response to Hindriks, see Haukioja 2005 . 10 I wish to thank two anonymous referees for the journal for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to Valtteri Arstila and Arto Repo for discussion and comments on a yet earlier version. This work has been financially supported by the Academy of Finland (grants 202513 and 207129).
